IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIVIL DIVISION

GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 07013084CI

DEBBIE VISICARO, et al.,

Defendant(s).

TRANSCRIPT OF: PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE: Honorable Anthony Rondolino

DATE: April 7, 2010

TIME: 4:05 p.m.

PLACE: Pinellas County Courthouse

Room 317

545 First Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida

REPORTED BY: Kimberly Ann Roberts

Notary Public

State of Florida at Large



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APPEARANCES:

STEVEN CHAPMAN FRASER, ESQUIRE
Law Offices of David J. Stern, PA
900 South Pine Island Road
Suite 400
Plantation, Florida 33324-3920
Appeared via telephone for Plaintiff

MICHAEL ALEX WASYLIK, ESQUIRE Ricardo, Wasylik & Kaniuk, PL Post Office Box 2245 Dade City, Florida 33526 Appeared for Defendant

The transcript of proceedings, before the Honorable Anthony Rondolino, taken on the 7th day of April, 2010, at the Pinellas County Courthouse, Room 317, 545 First Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida, beginning at 4:05 p.m., reported by Kimberly Ann Roberts, Notary Public in and for the State of Florida at Large.

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THE COURT: Okay. We're here today in GMAC versus Visicaro. This is a motion for rehearing regarding the previously drafted motion for summary judgment. Are we ready to proceed?

MR. WASYLIK: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. FRASER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WASYLIK: Your Honor, my name is
Michael Wasylik. I'm here for Defendants
Debbie and Frank Visicaro. We are here, as
the Court has already noted, on the motion for
rehearing of the previously granted motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiff's behalf.

We have submitted a fairly detailed brief on the reasons we believe that the motion was -- should not have been granted in

the initial hearing.

And in support of that, Your Honor, we have cited numerous cases mostly from the 2nd DCA which demonstrate the fact that there was no admissible evidence submitted by the plaintiff in support of the motion.

THE COURT: And I've reviewed your submissions and read numerous cases, including the ones that you've submitted; in addition, the Court's reviewed other cases.

What's the plaintiff's position regarding the motion at this time?

MR. FRASER: I object, and do not abuse your discretion by denying their motion for rehearing. You've considered all the evidence before you when you entered the summary judgment back in January of 2010.

The opposing party then could not offer proof to support their position on any genuine and material facts. Right now, Your Honor, there are no convincing exigent, you know, circumstances being offered up at the time.

THE COURT: Did you not read the motion? It sounds like you're making a very generalized argument, and this is an, as I

viewed it, extremely targeted motion which basically elaborates on the assertions that were raised at the time of the motion for summary judgment.

As I recall that, counsel appeared on behalf of his clients. I think it was by phone --

MR. WASYLIK: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- and made arguments that the Court really gave short shrift to it, did not review the cases at that time.

Since that time, for a number of reasons, the Court has delved further into it prior to receiving the motion for rehearing, which the Court believes to be very well drafted, and independent of the motion have researched the issues that are raised in the motion.

I've had several events which have occurred in cases which cause the Court to have great concern about the validity of the filings in our mortgage foreclosure cases, and that precipitated my reevaluation of the evidentiary considerations.

I'll give you an example of that. I
have one case that was called up for summary
judgment hearing, and I thought it was going
to be the typical granted situation, and then
a lawyer showed up for the defendant homeowner.

I was beginning to recite to the lawyer what I had typically recited, that there was no affidavits in opposition. And the lawyer said, "Well, I thought you might be interested in this," and handed me some documents which were out of another file in our circuit, and as it turned out, it was the same note and mortgage that was in a separate and independent file.

There was a different plaintiff pursuing a foreclosure proceeding on the same note and mortgage as the one that was being proceeded on. Both of the cases contained allegations in the original complaints that the separate plaintiffs were the owners and holders of the note. Both of them had a count to reestablish, and both of them had gone so far as to have affidavits filed in support of a summary judgment whereby an individual represented to the Court in the affidavit that the separate

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plaintiffs had possessed the note and had lost the note while it was in their possession.

Interestingly, both affidavits, although they were different plaintiffs, purported the same facts and they were executed by the same individual in alleged capacity as a director of two separate corporations, one of which was ultimately found to me to be an assignee of the original note.

So that really increased my interest in this subject matter, because I really honestly -- I don't have any confidence that any of the documents the Court's receiving on these mass foreclosures are valid.

But be that as it may, I'm still granting summary judgments unless it appears on the face of the submissions that there is a problem. And I've had a discussion with some of the other judges about whether the Court can grant a summary judgment based upon inadmissible evidence.

And it has been argued to me that the evidence not objected to can be received by a Court in trial, and so it certainly could be considered by a Court at a summary judgment

hearing.

Now, that's about all that's keeping me from denying summary judgment hearings even an -- motions in unopposed mortgage foreclosure cases. So I've said enough.

I'll go back to the defendant and say, would you like to address, say, the proposition that the affidavit, which was objected to, is inadmissible; that is, it's not offered properly to support the facts upon which it's asserted?

There's what seems to be the equivalent of a business record establishment in the affidavit, but there's no business record.

So do you have any specific arguments that contradict or shed a different light on the numerous 2nd District cases which have been cited by the movant?

MR. WASYLIK: Your Honor, I believe the Court said "defendant." I think you meant the plaintiff.

THE COURT: The plaintiff, yes.

MR. FRASER: Yes, Judge. You know,

Courts can take hearsay evidence at the

summary judgment proceeding. I believe there

is a case -- I don't have it with me --1 THE COURT: Yes, what is that, Courts 2 can take it? 3 MR. FRASER: Yeah. Sure. Μy understanding is that a Court can at the 5 summary judgment level accept hearsay. 6 7 THE COURT: Over objection? MR. FRASER: I do have a case that 8 stands for the proposition, not on me, that 9 Courts can take hearsay evidence at a summary 10 judgment level. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. FRASER: Whether or not over 13 objection, if it's objected to, I --14 THE COURT: Over objection? 15 MR. FRASER: -- I have no case to either 16 17 refute or support that. 18 THE COURT: You're going to have to speak up. I know that when you're getting 19 pummeled, it's hard to talk loudly, so 20 perhaps --21 Judge, my position is that MR. FRASER: 22 the Court -- you have the discretion to accept 23 hearsay evidence at summary judgment hearing. 24

There is -- today before you, my argument --

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and I do not have the motion in front of me --

THE COURT: So let me get this right.

We're here for the hearing, it was adequately scheduled, you had plenty of time, there are numerous case citations in his motion. You don't have it in front of you?

MR. FRASER: No, I do not, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. And you're purporting to base your opposition on a case that's out there that you don't have with you that I should rely on.

MR. FRASER: But --

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. FRASER: -- my argument today is you have the discretion under Willis v. L.W. Foster Sportswear Company, 352 So.2d 922, Florida Appellate 2nd District -- it's a 1971 case -- whereby you have the discretion to deny any motion for rehearing because there must be convincing exigent circumstances before accepting any new affidavits being offered up for the first time.

THE COURT: Well, how about the idea that I was wrong, and instead of having an

appeal where I'd be overturned and we had wasted all of that time, that I would rule correctly?

You know, I guess you're telling me I've got the discretion to be -- continually be wrong. What we're trying to address here is the fact that not that they failed to bring something up or that they've sat on their hands or anything. They attended the hearing, they pointed these matters out to the Court, the Court ruled unfavorably, they're giving me another chance before they appeal.

Now, to point out the case law -- and

I'm sort of thinking, well, gee, I'm not
hearing anything upon which I could base
admitting the evidence that was the foundation
for the summary judgment over their objection
other than your assertion that there is some
unnamed, unknown, uncited case out there which
supports the propositions. I've got a little
trouble with that.

I mean, do you need a minute or two to go scramble around and get that case for me?

MR. FRASER: No, Judge.

THE COURT: Well, I really want you to

send that to me. So I'm going to request that you send me the cases upon which you're asserting that I'm well within my reasonable exercise of my discretion to ignore all of these 2nd District Court cases, his objection, and allow hearsay as the only basis to support the summary judgment.

MR. FRASER: That -- that -- you know, that was not my argument.

My argument is that at the summary judgment level you can consider hearsay evidence.

MR. WASYLIK: Your Honor, may I respond --

MR. FRASER: I'm not saying -- I'm not

-- my argument is not, no, Judge, do not

follow everything that -- my argument is

this: You ruled correctly at the summary

judgment hearing. You can accept hearsay

evidence at the summary judgment hearing.

MR. WASYLIK: I apologize.

THE COURT: No. Go ahead.

MR. FRASER: That it's within your discretion to deny their motion for rehearing because at the time that the summary judgment

was entered into it was entered into --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me just --

MR. FRASER: -- correctly. That's our position.

THE COURT: -- okay. Well, you know, I'm not really trying to be argumentative.

I'm trying to --

MR. FRASER: Sure.

THE COURT: -- you know, I'm trying to rule correctly, and I'm in the hot seat because I'm the one who gets appealed and reversed on the thing if I just listen to you and I don't have a -- you know, a founded basis for it.

What I did was, I just put "summary judgment and hearsay" in Westlaw. The very first case that comes up is a January 12 case out of the 1st District. And it said, "Unsworn medical record review report attached to records custodian affidavit presented by insured in opposition to the uninsured motorist's motion for summary judgment motion was hearsay and could not be considered when ruling on the summary judgment motion."

The next case, Mitchell versus

Westfield, "Objected on the ground the affidavit and attached schedule was hearsay, insufficient to establish damages on summary judgment. We agree."

Lloyds Underwriters, "Hearsay statements on the matter would not be admissible into evidence and could not be relied upon to create an issue of fact of summary judgment."

Every single case that I'm going through here says can't do it. That's totally consistent with all of the cases that I've reviewed.

So I'm just begging you to send me some cases that would help me because I've got --well, in one morning, I've got 50 summary judgments in mortgage foreclosures.

I'm looking down at these affidavits, and I'm telling you what's going on in the judge's mind. I'm looking at them and saying, nobody has objected to this, but maybe I shouldn't be granting this summary judgment.

So you might help me out if you could give me a case which stands for the proposition that maybe simply if it's not objected to, I can consider it. I know that's

not the case here. But, I mean, that would at least be something, because I haven't even found any cases which support the proposition I can rely on hearsay even if it's not objected to.

MR. FRASER: The affidavit in the instant case is distinguishable than the affidavit in the first case in which you cited in Westlaw. I think that -- ours is a signed affidavit.

THE COURT: Yeah, but the affidavit does not constitute a basis upon which the personal knowledge of the facts contained therein can be determined. It's a business record qualification affidavit is what it is.

MR. FRASER: Paragraph Two of our affidavit says that based upon their personal knowledge, they're authorized to make certain statements therein.

THE COURT: You know what I'd really like to see? I'd like to see in one of these cases where a defense lawyer cross-examines, takes a deposition of these people, and we can see whether they ought be charged with perjury for all of these affidavits.

I would just love to see that, because

I'm going to tell you the truth, I had a

lawyer on the phone from Miami telling me that
they've got somebody in their office who is
authorized by reason of a power of attorney
filed as a public record. So that was
supposed to be the support that they have for
these personal knowledge affidavits.

MR. WASYLIK: Sir, that was in this case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WASYLIK: That was this affidavit.

I apologize for interrupting. I just wanted

-- I remember the Court coming to that

conclusion at the time.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WASYLIK: If I may briefly, I think
I may assist the Court in very briefly
directing the Court to Page Seven of our
brief, which addresses the issue of hearsay.

Both cases that we have cited on Page

Seven, which is the CSX Transport case -- was

actually cited on Page Six, but quoted on Page

Seven. The last line of that, Your Honor,

says, "Thus, the affidavit is based on hearsay

and is not sufficient to support summary
judgment."

The next case, Your Honor, cited Zoda v. Hedden --

THE COURT: I've got Zoda in my hand.

MR. WASYLIK: -- and the last line we cite of Zoda v. Hedden says, "His affidavit was based on hearsay and was incompetent to support summary judgment."

Your Honor, I believe that the Rule

1.510(e), which sets out the requirements for
affidavits, requires that the affidavit be
made on personal knowledge. Hearsay, of
course, is not personal knowledge. Business
records, unless they meet the hearsay
exception, do not qualify.

And I think, Your Honor, that conclusively addresses the issue of whether or not affidavits that are hearsay can be used to support for summary judgment.

Your Honor, the point about whether or not it's objected to, I think, is a point that while not alive in this issue today is something that probably the Court should -- the Court would be well to continue to

consider.

However, with respect to hearsay in affidavits when that hearsay is objected to, I think, Your Honor, that both the rule expressly prohibits it and the case law interpreting that rule also expressly prohibits it.

And I think the reason for that, Your Honor, the basis for that will be more clear when the Court considers the last case that we cited in our brief, which is the Bifulco case, Bifulco v. State Farm, 693 So.2d 707.

And, Your Honor, that's a 4th DCA case from 1997. But I think it illustrates the point pretty well. And the reason, Your Honor, that the Courts are to -- this is my word -- rigidly apply the requirements of 1.510(e) regarding evidence -- summary judgment evidence is because granting of summary judgment cuts off a party's right to trial, which the Bifulco court observes is a constitutional right.

The standard, Your Honor, in granting summary judgment, again, cited in the first
-- the opening page of our brief -- I'll flip

to that -- but the standard, Your Honor, I think the Court is well familiar with, is that the facts, the evidence before the Court on summary judgment, have to be shown beyond the slightest doubt.

And that's Mivan or Mivan, M-i-v-a-n, Florida versus Metric Constructors, Inc., 857 So.2d 901, and that's a 5th DCA case from 2003, talking about the slightest doubt. Your Honor, where there is the slightest doubt of -- that's a higher burden than a criminal defendant enjoys.

A non-movant in summary judgment enjoys an actual higher burden. A slightest doubt is, of course, a stricter standard than a more reasonable -- than a reasonable doubt. And so like a criminal defendant who comes clothed in a presumption of innocence to the Court, a non-movant in a summary judgment proceeding comes to the Court clothed in the presumption that the judgment should not be entered against them, that they will get their right to trial, you know, barring the conclusive proof by the plaintiff in using the admissible evidence described by the rule.

So when put in the context of the constitutional right of the parties to have their trial on any facts that could decide their case, I think that that would -- that pretty thoroughly rebuts the discretion argument being lobbied by the plaintiff in this case.

THE COURT: Well, I have in my hand when you started your argument Zoda and CSX. Both of those cases deal with an insufficiency of an affidavit based upon examination of business records or the contents of records, and they both are 2nd District cases which seem to be very closely on point with the case that we have today.

I'm also enlightened by Jones versus

Florida Workers' Compensation, which is a 2001

2nd District case that finds that the

affidavit was insufficient in that it had

allegations that all the assertions and

allegations in the complaint are true, that

kind of an affidavit is insufficient.

I also reviewed Hurricane Boats versus

Certified Industrial Fabricators and found

that affidavit to be insufficient when it

related to the allegations in the complaint being true.

I'll note that there are -- there is a significant difference in the foundation a witness has for establishment of business records and the ability of that witness to testify about those facts. Authentication of a record is different than admissibility.

And I'll note the case of Dollar versus State of Florida, which is 685 So.2d 901. Similar concerns have been expressed by the Courts with regard to the authentication of official records in Monroe County versus McCormick at 692 So.2d 214 and other cases.

In regard to the inadmissibility and hearsay, this Court has determined that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th and 5th Districts have all recited in cases the fact that inadmissible hearsay cannot be considered at a summary judgment and applies this rule, not only to the affidavits of the plaintiff in support of -- or a movant in support of a summary judgment, but also affidavits in opposition.

The 5th DCA in Mullan versus the Bishop of the Diocese at 540 So.2d 174

reversed a summary judgment based upon hearsay. The 1st District in Rose versus ADT, 989 So.2d 1244, reversed a summary judgment. And the 1st District in Pawlik, P-a-w-l-i-k, at 528 So.2d 965 had some observations about the inadmissible hearsay, the 3rd District in Capello, 625 So.2d 474.

And to perhaps address the concerns
that I brought up about the non-objection, I
have found one case which appears to stand for
the proposition that even under circumstances
where the -- there was an unopposed affidavit,
the appellate court reversed lower court. And
this was in a forfeiture case, 2nd District
Court of Appeal. This is the In Re: Forfeiture
of a 1980 Ford Pickup, 779 So.2d 450. There
was a summary judgment proceeding.

The detective's affidavit was inadmissible hearsay and, thus, was not competent to support the summary judgment of forfeiture in the case, even though it's noted in the opinion that "We reversed the forfeiture because it was based upon a summary judgment that the trial court had entered in reliance on unopposed but insufficient

affidavits, pursuant to the Florida Rule of 1 2 Civil Procedure 1.510(e)." So based upon those and other cases, the 3 Court has had -- I'm going to have to grant 4 the motion and set aside the previously 5 6 improvidently entered summary judgment in this 7 case. All right. 8 MR. WASYLIK: Your Honor, would you like 9 me to take a crack at drafting the order then? THE COURT: Yes. Make it simple. 10 11 MR. WASYLIK: Yes, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much, Counsel. 13 14 MR. FRASER: Thank you. THE COURT: All right. 15 16 MR. FRASER: Bye. 17 (At 4:25 p.m., the proceedings conclude.) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

STATE OF FLORIDA:

COUNTY OF HILLSBOROUGH:

I, Kimberly Ann Roberts, Notary Public in and for the State of Florida at Large, do hereby certify that I reported in shorthand the foregoing proceedings at the time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes were thereafter reduced to typewriting under my supervision; and that the foregoing pages are a true and correct, verbatim record of the aforesaid proceedings.

Witness my hand and seal April 12, 2010, in the City of Tampa, County of Hillsborough, State of Florida.

Kimberly Ann Roberts Notary Public

State of Florida at Large

